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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the market structure of Vietnam’s banking system from 1999 to 2009 using the 
non-structural (Panzar-Rosse) model. We consider a more comprehensive range of specifications, in 
terms of a greater number of environmental covariates and different dependent variables, than in 
previous applications of this model. Further, this is the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid 
endogeneity) and excludes assets (to avoid specification bias) in such a study of the Vietnamese 
banking system. We find that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopolistic competition 
with non-state owned commercial banks behaving more competitively than state owned commercial 
banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we provide a detailed analysis of the degree of market competition in the Vietnamese 
banking system using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) non-structural model. This model suggests that the 
market is a monopoly if the service offered by a particular bank is independent and originate. In 
contrast, the market is competitive if bank services are similar in the market. We apply the non-
structural model to an extensive panel data set of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks, which includes 
state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks, from 1999 to 2009. Using this 
procedure we consider whether the Vietnamese banking market is best characterised by monopoly, 
perfect competition or the intermediate case of monopolistic competition.  
 
We estimate H-statistics of models that include assets and that exclude assets with current or lagged 
input prices using the full sample (1999-2009) and sub-samples (1999–2003; 2004–2009; five state 
owned commercial banks and 43 non-state owned commercial banks). We also estimate E-statistics to 
test whether the long-run equilibrium conditions required for the H-statistics to be valid hold. The Wu-
Hausman test and a comparison of models using current and lagged input prices are employed to 
assess whether input prices are endogenous. This is the first study that uses lagged input prices (to 
avoid endogeneity) and excludes assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. 
This study also extends the previous literature (Bikker et al., 2006a, 2006b and Bikker and Spierdijk, 
2009) by considering new additional variables such as total assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and 
the number of branches in the model’s specification. In addition, we compare inference using four 
alternative dependent variables being revenue/assets, interest income/assets, revenue and interest 
income. However, the main contribution of this paper is to determine the market structure in the 
recent period after the Vietnamese banking system has transformed into a less centralised two-tier 
system. Our study is the first to uniquely identify the market structure of this developing economy’s 
banking system (using data only for Vietnam and not observations from other countries) in a post 
transition period.1 Another novelty of the paper is to assess whether market structure changes 
through time or is different by bank type. 
 
                                                 
1
 The few previous studies that have sought to determine Vietnam’s market structure have done so in an earlier period 
when less of the transition had taken place and assumed homogeneity of the Vietnamese banking system’s market 
structure with the other countries analysed. 
3 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with developments in the Vietnamese 
banking system in the period from 1986 to 2009; section 3 provides a literature review of the non-
structural model in banking; section 4 discusses methodology and data; section 5 presents our 
empirical results; and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009 
 
From 1986 to 2009 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to two-tier banking 
system. The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam as the central bank (tier 1) and 
four specialised state owned banks (tier 2). Table 1 shows the number of Vietnamese commercial 
banks from 1990 to 2009. With extended networks in almost all provinces and larger cities, state 
owned commercial banks have a competitive edge in providing banking services. Although joint stock 
commercial banks increased their numbers immediately after their appearance in 1990 (in 2009 there 
were 37 joint stock commercial banks), the leading positions in the market still belong to state owned 
commercial banks. Three out of five state owned commercial banks accounted for 45% of customer 
deposits, 41% of total assets and 51% of customer loans of the banking system in 2009. State owned 
commercial banks were originally sector departments under the State Bank of Vietnam, with specified 
lending programmes to state owned enterprises which were based on government policies.  
 
Non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint stock commercial banks, branches of foreign 
banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks 2 . Unlike state owned 
commercial banks a number of joint stock commercial banks make profits due to good performance. 
Joint stock commercial banks have achieved average returns on equity between 15% and 30%. Being 
less than 15 years old joint stock commercial banks are relatively young and they can be divided into 
three groups: (1) the top five large urban banks; (2) a smaller group of banks that are either growing 
rapidly or have established a niche; and (3) twelve small rural joint stock commercial banks. The top 
five urban banks are, Techcombank, Sacombank, VIBBank, Asia Commercial Bank, and East Asia 
Commercial Bank. The smaller urban joint stock commercial banks include, HabuBank, Viet A Bank and 
Saigon Bank. Small rural commercial banks were all transformed into city commercial banks at the end 
                                                 
2
 Foreign commercial banks normally transformed out of branches of foreign banks. Data on assets, loans and deposits of branches of 
foreign banks are very small compared to other banks. Therefore, in our application non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint 
stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and one foreign commercial bank.  
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of 2010, such as, An Binh Bank, Saigon-Hanoi Bank, Petrolimex Group Bank, Dai A Bank, etc. These 
banks developed throughout the country, not just in rural areas and with help from big business and 
foreign investors they also performed well in the 2000s. The number of branches of foreign banks 
increased from 18 banks in 1995 to 48 banks in 2009. However, each foreign bank normally has one 
branch in either Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City. Hence, their assets, loans and deposits are very small 
compared to state owned commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks and joint venture 
commercial banks. Despite Foreign Direct Investment in US dollar terms growing by a factor of eight 
between 1990 and 2005, foreign companies are still hesitant as whether or not to choose domestic 
banks when they enter this new market. The number of joint venture commercial banks has increased 
slightly from four to six banks between 1995 and 2009. The first foreign commercial bank (being HSBC) 
had a license to set up a wholly foreign-owned bank from 2008 (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). 
 
Table 2 shows data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese 
banking system (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 
to 2009. On the whole, there was an increasing trend of loans, assets, deposits and capital over the 
period. Vietnamese banks were burdened by a high volume of non-performing loans, particularly 
during the 1990s, however these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing loans of 
non-state owned commercial banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial banks.  
 
In terms of regulation, the State Bank of Vietnam aims to create a banking supervision development 
(following Basel) from 2010 onwards. Meanwhile, the coverage, measures and procedures of banking 
supervision and monitoring are to be reformed in accordance with the development of internet 
technologies and banking technology. This will be done by applying key principles of international 
standards on banking supervision (Basel I and Basel II). The old capital adequacy ratio standards for 
banks in Basel I and Basel II are 8% and 12%, respectively. The capital adequacy ratio for the 
Vietnamese commercial banks is to be adjusted to 9% (as Circular No. 13/TT-NHNN dated 20th May 
2010 of the State Bank of Vietnam). 
 
In parallel with the speed of the country’s economic development, the loan growth rate rose 
dramatically. One of the reasons was that many banks had greatly increased their credit growth 
through real estate loans, due to the over-heating of the real estate market. The credit growth rate of 
the banking system increased to 37.8% in 2007 and peaked at an alarming 63% in the first quarter of 
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2008 (WB, 2008: 3). This has been the highest growth rate within the past decade. When the inflation 
rate and trade balance deficit had become more serious, the government applied a traditional 
tightening of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation, which affected the banking 
system. Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to reorganise and strengthen their 
organisations.  
 
3. Literature review 
 
Empirical studies that use the non-structural model to establish the extent of contestability in banking 
markets are concerned with drawing inferences about market structure indirectly from observing 
conduct. This is because contestability, which depends on the extent of potential competition, is not 
observable directly (Goddard et al., 2001). Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulated simple models for 
monopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets, and develop a test to discriminate 
between these market structures. Bikker and Bos (2008) explained this non-structural model as based 
on the properties of a reduced-form revenue equation at the firm or bank level and using the H-
statistic, which, under certain assumptions, can serve as a measure of how competitive banks are. The 
test is from a general banking model, which determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium 
number of banks by maximizing profits at both the bank level and the industry level. This implies, first, 
that bank i maximises its profits, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The profit maximising 
condition is: 
 
0),,('),,('  iiiiii TnYCZnYR  (1) 
 
Ri refers to revenue, Ci to cost, Yi to output, wi to a vector of m factor input prices, and Zi and Ti to 
vectors of exogenous variables that shift the bank’s revenue and cost functions, respectively. The sub 
index i refers to bank i; n is the number of banks; and the prime symbol denotes a first derivative with 
respect to output. Second, at the market level, it means that, in equilibrium, the zero supernormal 
profit constraint holds: 
 
0),*,(*)*,*,(*  iiii TwYCZnYR  (2) 
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Variables marked with an asterisk (*) represent equilibrium values. Market power is measured by the 
extent to which a change in factor input prices (dwk,i) for k = 1,..., m is reflected in changes in 
equilibrium revenue (dR*i), earned by bank i. Panzar and Rosse (1987) defined a measure of 
competition H as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to 
factor prices: 
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The first market model that Panzar and Rosse investigates is monopoly. In their analysis, monopoly 
includes the case of price-taking competitive banks, as long as the prices they face are truly 
exogenous, that is, as long as their equilibrium values are unaffected by changes in the other 
exogenous variables in the model. The empirical refutation of monopoly constitutes a rejection of the 
assumption that the revenue of the banks in question is independent of the decisions made by their 
actual or potential rivals. The Panzar and Rosse model demonstrates that under monopoly, an increase 
in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce 
revenue; hence H will be zero or negative. In the case of monopolistic competition, the analysis is 
based on the comparative static properties of the Chamberlain equilibrium model. In the equilibrium 
condition, interdependence affects the structural revenue function, and the bank’s profit finally 
becomes zero as the conditions of entry and withdrawal are unlimited; hence H will be smaller than 1. 
In the case of perfect competition, under certain conditions both marginal cost and average cost 
increase without changing the optimum amount of the individual bank’s output. If this condition 
occurs and some banks withdraw from the market, the remaining banks would individually face 
increased demand. This increased demand leads to higher prices and revenue, which is equal to the 
increase of cost, and H will become 1. In summary: 
 
 H ≤ 0: indicates a monopoly. 
 0 < H < 1: indicates the intermediate case of monopolistic competition. 
 H = 1: indicates a perfectly competitive industry. 
 
Shaffer (1982) obtained 0<H<1 for a sample of unit banks in the New York banking sector, suggesting 
monopolistic competition. Nathan and Neaven (1989) confirmed this result for New York banks even 
when the effect of loan losses is considered. Nathan and Neaven (1989) tested for contestability for a 
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group of Canadian banks, trust companies and mortgage companies with data for the period from 
1982 to 1984. The result indicated 0<H<1. DeBandt and Davis (2000) provided a significant 
improvement on the specification of variables employed in the model and its functional form. They 
emphasised that the banking industry is not a general industry, like manufacturing but instead an 
industry with individual characteristics, which is in line with the argument of Panzar and Rosse (1987). 
They obtained 0<H<1 for France, Germany, Italy and the US. Competition appears to be most intense 
in the US while small banks are found to enjoy some monopoly power in the German and French 
markets.  
 
The model used for calculating the H-statistic has taken a variety of specific forms in the general 
banking literature. Molyneux et al. (1994) and Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) employed the ratio of 
interest revenue to the total balance sheet as an endogenous variable. Molyneux et al. (1994) 
investigated major European banking markets between 1986 and 1989 and they suggested that banks 
in Germany, the UK, France and Spain were in monopolistic competition during this period whereas 
banks in Italy behave as if in monopoly. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) used data on 892 banks from 15 
EU countries over the sample period 1989-1996. Their results show that European banking sectors 
operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. On the other hand, Nathan and Neave (1989) 
used the logarithm of interest revenue as the dependent variable. According to DeBandt and Davis 
(2000) this is the most appropriate measure since the ratio of interest revenue to total assets might be 
interpreted as yielding a price equation rather than a revenue function. There is an issue homogeneity 
might be induced even in the logarithmic specification. DeBandt and Davis (2000) insisted that in 
empirical studies on banking competition, although cross-sectional results are generally employed, the 
implicit assumption is that all banks have access to the same factor market and only the scale of 
operations differ. They argued that the dimension of the time-series is crucial, and that irregular 
results might arise from estimating a cross-sectional regression of the equation with Ordinary Least 
Square for every year (t=1, …T). As a result they asserted that it is desirable to focus on the pooled 
sample regression.  
 
In Vietnam, three previous studies have applied the Panzar-Rosse model to the Vietnamese banking 
system. Bikker et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) analysed bank structure in the 
world (with 101 countries including Vietnam) from 1986-2004. Due to data constraints, they only 
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investigated banking structure in Vietnam from 1991 to 2004 for 24 banks.3 They calculated the H-
statistic for the Vietnamese banking system as 0.74. However, they applied only one model for all 101 
countries, including Vietnam, and this model did not reflect the actual business in Vietnam where 
state owned commercial banks still dominate the whole banking system. Further, they could not 
observe the three input prices directly. Therefore, they used the ratio of annual personal expenses to 
total assets as an approximation for the price of personal expenses, and the ratio of other non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for the price of capital expenditure. Moreover, Bikker et al. (2006a, 
2006b) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) preferred interest income as the dependent variable, while 
other researchers, such as Nathan and Neave (2001), favour using revenue in the Panzar-Rosse model. 
Hence, for comparison purposes we will use both interest income and revenue as the dependent 
variables in this paper. 
 
Our data set includes 48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009. This is the first 
time that such an extensive panel data set has been employed to uniquely identify the Vietnamese 
banking system’s market structure using the non-structural model (our maximum sample period is 376 
observations). No previous study has used lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and excluded 
assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. Further, we estimate models for 
the whole banking system as well as for the following sub-samples: state owned commercial banks; 
non-state owned commercial banks; 1999–2003; and 2004–2009. The consideration of these sub-
samples is also a contribution of our paper. Environmental factors such as total assets, capital/assets, 
loans/deposits and the number of branches are incorporated in our models and have not all been 
employed in previous studies of Vietnam. In addition, for comparative purposes, we use the following 
four different dependent variables: revenue divided by total assets (REV/TA); interest income divided 
by total assets (INT/TA); revenue (REV); and interest income (INT). We use the non-structural model to 
determine whether the Vietnamese banking system is best characterised by monopoly, monopolistic 
competition or perfect competition.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
4.1. The calculation of H-statistics 
                                                 
3 The total number of observations for Vietnam that they use is only 135 whereas our maximum sample size is 376 observations. 
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We estimate non-structural models based on the Panzar-Rosse specification using the following 
empirical form: 
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,  is the loans to deposits ratio; LN(TAi,t) is the natural logarithm of total assets and 
LN(BRi,t) is the natural logarithm of the number of branches. 
 
The H-statistic, which is used to determine the degree of competition, is calculated from (4) using: 
 
321  H  (5) 
 
From equation (5), if H ≤ 0 the market is a monopoly, if 0 < H < 1 the market is in monopolistic 
competition and if H = 1 the market is in perfect competition.  
 
4.2. Models with and without assets 
 
Many previous empirical studies include among the controls the log of assets, )( ,tiTALN , to measure 
size or some other similarly defined measure of bank size; and many studies also scale the dependent 
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variables with total assets, that is: )(
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LN . However, Bikker et al. (2006a) 
pointed out that it is incorrect to estimate a revenue elasticity using a specification that includes a 
quantity-type variable among the controls, or using a specification which, through rescaling, converts a 
revenue variable into a price-type variable. In fact, if )( ,tiTALN appears among the controls, then it is 
immaterial whether the dependent variable is unscaled (not divided by total assets) or scaled (divided 
by total assets). In either case the coefficients on the factor input prices (  ,   ,   ) should be 
interpreted as output price elasticities and not as revenue elasticities. The model is misspecified if 
assets are included and inference regarding market structure is invalid. Hence, on the left hand side of 
the models, the dependent variables should be )( ,tiREVLN and )( ,tiINTLN instead of )(
,
,
ti
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TA
REV
LN  and
)(
,
,
ti
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TA
REV
LN , respectively. Further, )( ,tiTALN should be removed from the right hand side of the 
models (Goddard and Wilson, 2009).4 The valid unscaled model is obtained from (4) with      and 
using the unscaled dependent variables, )( ,tiREVLN  and )( ,tiINTLN . 
 
4.3. Calculating the E-statistics (testing equilibrium) 
 
For the H-statistic to be a valid test it must be calculated on observations that are in long-run 
equilibrium. This suggests that competitive capital markets will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return 
across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of returns should not be significantly correlated with input 
prices (Shaffer, 1982; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995; Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994; Classens and Laeven, 
2004 and Matthews et al., 2007). Thus, in the context of the theory of competitiveness and 
contestability set out in (4) we specify a model for the determination of whether equilibrium holds. 
This is obtained by replacing the dependent variable in (4) with profit before tax on assets (1+PBT/TA) 
thus: 5 
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4
 In this study, we estimate models that both include and exclude assets for comparison purposes.  
5
 Because profit before tax can take on small (negative) values, we compute the dependent variable as (1+PBT/TA). 
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A version of (6) without  is also estimated by setting 06  . 
 
The E-statistic that is used for testing whether the market is in equilibrium is defined as: 
 
321  E  (7) 
 
We test whether E = 0 using an F-test. If rejected, the market is not in equilibrium (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004), whereas if E = 0 the market is in equilibrium and the H-statistic calculated using (4) and 
(5) is valid. 
 
 
4.4. Models with current and lagged input prices 
 
 
Simultaneity is a dual direction of causality in a system of equations which violates the assumption 
that the explanatory variables and equation’s error term are uncorrelated. Variables in a regression 
can violate this assumption for several reasons, including omitted variable bias, measurement error 
and simultaneity/reverse causation. In our regression, the models including the current values of input 
prices might suffer from simultaneity (endogeneity) bias between input prices and the dependent 
variables (revenue and interest income). We use two methods to determine whether or not one or 
more of the input prices (LN(IE/FF), LN(PE/TE) and LN(CE/FA)) suffers from endogeneity. The first is the 
Wu-Hausman test6 while the second compares regressions using current and lagged input prices - see 
Shaffer (2004) and Goddard and Wilson (2009). To obtain models using lagged input prices current 
price variables are replaced by their values lagged one time period in (4) and (6). Large differences in 
the estimated coefficients (and therefore H-statistics and E-statistics) using models with current input 
prices and using models with lagged input prices is taken as an indication of the endogeneity of input 
prices. 
 
 
4.5. Data 
 
                                                 
6 The Wu-Hausman test tests for weak exogeneity. We use it to test whether the input price variables in our models may be treated as if 
they are exogenous for the purpose of estimation such that Ordinary Least Squares produces valid estimates. 
)( ,tiTALN
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In this paper, annual individual balance sheets and income statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial 
banks from 1999 to 2009 have been collected from the State Bank of Vietnam, National Library of 
Vietnam and individual banks. Although the number of banks for which there is data is only half of the 
total in the Vietnamese banking system they account for more than 90% of total customer loans, total 
customer deposits and total assets.7  
5. Empirical results 
Table 3 reports the non-structural model estimated for the full sample.8 The results include estimated 
revenue (in the column headed “H-statistics”) and profit (in the column headed “E-statistics”) 
equations using all measures of the dependent variable with current or lagged input prices both with 
and without assets for the full sample. 10H  refers to the F-test of the null hypothesis that cross-
sectional fixed-effects are redundant. 20H  refers to the F-test of the null hypothesis that both cross-
sectional and time-period fixed-effects are redundant. All of the F-tests reject the exclusion of cross-
sectional and period fixed-effects, therefore, the ‘2-way-FE’ model is favoured and reported in the 
table. 9 We also report R2, the adjusted R2 (Adj R2), the statistic for testing the null hypothesis that R2 = 
0 (F-statistic) and the number of observations.  
 
The H-statistic is reported in the row labelled H-sta. in the table. The H-statistics are 0.59 (with 
LN(REV/TA) as the dependent variable) and 0.62 (with LN(INT/TA)) in the models with assets and with 
current input prices. The rows below the H-statistics show the result of t-tests for the null hypotheses 
that H = 0 and H = 1. The H-statistics are significantly different from both zero and one in these 
models.  When the H-statistic is between zero and one (as in this case), it indicates monopolistic 
competition. In the models without assets and with current input prices, the H-statistics are 0.96 for 
the equation where LN(REV) is the dependent variable and 0.98 for the specification with LN(INT) as 
the regressand. They are both significantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one. 
                                                 
7
 Five of the 48 banks are state owned commercial banks, five are joint stock commercial banks, one is a foreign commercial bank and 
the remaining 37 are joint stock commercial banks. Several banks established in 2008 and 2009 are included in the data. The number of 
records ranged from a low of 17 banks in 1999 to a high of 46 in 2009. Banks also have differing frequencies of years in the data – see 
Table 1. There are sixteen banks with data for all years; twelve banks with 4–8 years of data; fourteen banks with 5–7 years of data and 
five banks with 2–4 years of data (of which three banks were established in 2008 and one bank was founded in 2006). Only one bank 
(which was transformed from a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign commercial bank in 2008) has one year of data.  
8
 The results of the sub-samples 1999–2003; 2004–2009; five state owned commercial banks and 43 non-state owned commercial banks 
are presented in Table 5. 
9
 ‘2-way-FE’ incorporates both cross-sectional and period fixed-effects. 
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Since    this indicates that the Vietnamese banking system is a competitive industry.10 Comparing 
the models with and without assets we notice that excluding total assets from the revenue equations 
has transformed our inference of the Vietnamese banking market from monopolistic competition to 
perfect competition. This is consistent with the prediction of Bikker et al. (2006a) and Goddard and 
Wilson (2009) because the downward bias in H is removed when assets are excluded.  
 
In the models with assets and with lagged input prices, the H-statistic is 0.16 when LN(REV/TA) is the 
dependent variable and 0.13 when LN(INT/TA) is the regressand. The null hypotheses that the H-
statistic is zero or one are both rejected. This indicates that the industry is in monopolistic 
competition, if close to monopoly. Lastly, the H-statistics based upon revenue equations excluding 
assets that include lagged input prices as regressors are 0.45-0.43 (both are significantly different from 
zero and one, indicating monopolistic competition). These H-statistics are notably smaller than the 
corresponding equations that use current input prices, being 0.96-0.98. This difference is most likely 
due to simultaneity bias. Hence we favour the results using lagged input prices and without assets for 
inference and conclude that the Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition.11    
 
Table 4 report results from the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity using the full sample. The 
instrument set is the same for all three input price variables being instrumented. The results show that 
all F-tests for the significance of the explanatory power of the instrumented input price equations are 
significant at the 1% level. The Wu-Hausman test suggests that there is general evidence of 
endogeneity in the models with assets although there is less evidence of endogeneity in the models 
without assets. Nevertheless, the large differences in coefficients in the estimated models both with 
and without assets are suggestive of endogeneity for models both with and without assets. With this 
in mind we will use the models employing lagged input prices in order to secure valid inference12.  
                                                 
10
 An increase in costs causes some banks to exit, prices to increase, and the revenue of the survivors to rise at the same rate as the 
increase in costs. 
11
 Regarding the other control variables, capital/assets (TC/TA) is positive and significant in the models with assets using current and 
lagged input prices, and it is negative and significant when assets are excluded. The first implies that there is a positive relationship 
between both revenue and interest income with the capital/asset ratio in the models with assets. The second shows that increasing the 
capital/asset ratio causes a reduction in revenue in the models excluding assets, which is consistent with our expectations. The number 
of branches (LN(BR)) is positive and significant in all the models except for the models with assets using lagged input prices. This implies 
that revenue and interest income generally increase when banks open more branches. Loan/deposit (CL/CD) is generally insignificant, 
except for the models with lagged input prices (with and without assets) when revenue is the dependent variable. This means there is 
generally no significant increase of revenue and interest income even if banks offer more loans to customers. This is consistent with our 
expectation. Total assets (LN(TA)) is negative and significant in the models with assets using current and lagged input prices.  
12 We also applied the Wu-Hausman test on the sub-samples 1999–2003; 2004–2009; five state owned commercial banks and 43 non-
state owned commercial banks. The results also show that all F-tests for the significance of the explanatory power of the instrumented 
input price equations are significant at the 1% level except for LN(CE/FA) in the sub-sample for state owned commercial banks (without 
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Table 3 also shows the results of the profit equations and their E-statistics for the full sample (in the 
column headed “E-statistics”). The E-statistic is used to determine whether the long-term equilibrium 
condition of the market is met. If the E-statistic is equal to zero the market is in long-term equilibrium 
whereas when the E-statistic is not equal to zero the market is not in long-term equilibrium. If the 
market is not in equilibrium, the value of the H-statistic (obtained from the corresponding revenue 
equation) is temporal and the degree of competitiveness is changing through time. In this case the 
estimated models are not valid for inference and it is appropriate to employ a dynamic model to 
determine the equilibrium value of the market. We use the ‘2-way-FE’ specification for inference 
because both cross-section and time-period fixed-effects are jointly significant according to the 20H  F-
test. The E-statistic in the ‘2-way-FE’ models are 0.007 (with assets and with current input prices), 
0.006 (without assets and with current input prices), 0.007 (with assets and with lagged input prices) 
and 0.003 (without assets and with lagged input prices). They do not reject the null hypothesis that the 
Vietnamese banking system is in equilibrium. Hence, all the corresponding H-statistics are valid. Due to 
simultaneity bias in the models using current input prices (according to the Wu-Hausman test reported 
in Table 4) and the misspecification of the models that include assets (see, Bikker et al., 2006a; 
Goddard and Wilson, 2009) we favour the model without assets and with lagged input prices. We 
therefore conclude that the Vietnamese banking system is in long-run equilibrium (        ) and 
characterised by monopolistic competition (            ) during the period 1999 to 2009. 
 
As for the three input prices, the unit cost of funds (LN(IE/FF)) is positive and significant at the 1% level 
for both dependent variables over the full sample. The unit price of labour (LN(PE/TE)) is positive and 
significant at the 10% level in the model where revenue is the dependent variable and insignificant 
when interest income is the regressand. The unit cost of fixed assets (LN(CE/FA)) is insignificant in the 
models with both dependent variables. These results suggest that the unit cost of funds has the most 
significant impact on revenue and interest income of the three input prices. Regarding the other 
                                                                                                                                                                        
assets) which is significant at the 5% level. Further, the F-statistic exceeds 10 in 5 of the 6 cases (in the one case that it is below 10 the F-
statistic is 9,360), see Stock and Watson (2012). Given these results the instruments are considered valid (not weak). Regarding the Wu-
Hausman test, the results show that there is evidence of endogeneity in the revenue and interest income equations when assets are 
included in the models. However, when assets are excluded from the revenue equations there is no endogeneity in the revenue 
equations. Hence, these results suggest that we can employ current input prices for the revenue and interest income models (without 
assets). In contrast, these results also suggest that we should employ lagged input prices for the revenue and interest income models 
which include assets. With the profit equations there is always evidence of endogeneity. Therefore, it would be safest to produce all E-
statistics based on the profit equations using lagged input prices.  
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variables in our favoured models estimated over the full sample, customer loans over customer 
deposits (CL/CD) and total capital over total assets (TC/TA) are negative and significant while the 
number of branches (LN(BR)) is positive and significant.  
 
Summary of results for the sub-samples: 
 
Table 5 summarises unreported results obtained using sub-samples of the data (available from the 
authors on request). The results are for models using current and lagged input prices both with and 
without assets included. All of the F-tests reject the exclusion of cross-sectional and period fixed-
effects and so the ‘2-way-FE’ model is favoured and used for inference. All the models are in 
equilibrium except the sub-sample 1999-2003 using lagged input prices and with LN(REV/TA), LN(REV) 
and LN(INT) as the dependent variables. There are differences between the models using current and 
lagged input prices. The models based on current input prices suggest that the full sample and sub-
samples are generally in monopolistic competition. However, the models using lagged input prices 
including assets indicate that the full sample and sub-samples behave as if in monopoly except for the 
full sample when LN(REV/TA) is the dependent variable. When assets are excluded from the models, 
the full sample and non-state owned commercial banks sub-sample indicate monopolistic competition 
while the other sub-samples suggest monopoly. The Wu-Hausman test indicates endogeneity in most 
of the models including assets if in only a few models that exclude assets. However, the difference in 
the estimated coefficients of the models with and without assets suggests evidence of endogeneity in 
both. Therefore we prefer the models using lagged input prices for inference.  
 
In the favoured models using lagged input prices, the H-statistics are generally higher for models 
where revenue is the dependent variable than when it is interest income (except for the state owned 
commercial banks sub-sample). Hence the market appears more competitive when based on revenue. 
Revenue includes interest income plus fee and commission income where interest income accounts 
for most of revenue. In contrast, the models based upon current input prices generally show that the 
H-statistics are generally higher for the models when interest income is the dependent variable than 
when it is revenue except for the sub-sample 2004-2009 without assets.  
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Another finding relates to the exclusion of the natural logarithm of total assets from the model. The 
removal of total assets from all the models transforms our inference regarding the market toward 
being more competitive as predicted by Bikker et al. (2006a) and Goddard and Wilson (2009). In the 
models using lagged input prices, the H-statistics for the full sample are between 0.16 and 0.13 when 
assets are included while the corresponding range is 0.45 to 0.43 when total assets are excluded from 
the models. On the other hand, the H-statistics of the models with current input prices are 0.59 and 
0.62 with assets included and when we eliminate assets from the models the corresponding range is 
0.96 and 0.98. Given that inference in the models including total assets is inappropriate and the 
models using lagged input prices are preferred for inference we would conclude from these results 
that the Vietnamese banking system and non-state owned commercial banks are in monopolistic 
competition over the whole period. Further, the Vietnamese banking system in the sub-periods 1999-
2003 and 2004-2009 and state owned commercial banks operate in monopoly. These results are 
slightly different from Bikker et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009). They investigated 
banking structure in Vietnam during the period of 1991-2004 for 24 banks (the number of 
observations was only 135) with current input prices but they could not observe the three input price 
directly. They provided an H-statistic of 0.74, using interest income as the dependent variable. This 
suggested that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopolistic competition. Our H-statistic is 
0.82 for LN(INT/TA) from 1999 to 2003 with assets and current input prices. This indicates that the 
Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition but also suggests that the industry is not 
different from perfect competition.  
 
Further, the empirical results of the models using lagged input prices and excluding assets show that 
non-state owned commercial banks are more competitive than state owned commercial banks. The H-
statistics for non-state owned commercial banks are between 0.54 and 0.52 in the models that 
exclude assets. The corresponding range for state owned commercial banks is -0.14 to -0.15. 
Therefore, non-state owned commercial banks behave as if in monopolistic competition while state 
owned commercial banks behave as if in a monopoly environment.  
 
Regarding the time period there is another interesting finding. The results (without assets and with 
lagged input prices) suggest that in the period 1999-2003 the market is slightly less competitive than 
during period 2004-2009. This is also consistent with our expectations about these two periods. Some 
banks were established in the period 2004-2009 and as new banks they offered loans with good rates 
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for customers. They are also not affected by non-performing loans as existing banks are. The H-
statistics are 0.03 and -0.05 in the sub-period 1999-2003. The corresponding results for the sub-period 
2004-2009 are 0.05 and 0.03. Hence, whilst the degree of competition has increased through time it 
has only increased slightly. 
 
There is an apparent inconsistency because the full sample results (1999-2009) suggest that the 
market is in monopolistic competition while both sub-sample results (1999-2003 and 2004-2009) 
indicate that the industry is monopolistic. We are inclined to favour the full sample results that are 
based on more data (especially as equilibrium cannot be rejected) and infer that the market is 
characterised by monopolistic competition. The sub-sample results use less data and are regarded 
only as indicative of the change in the degree of competition. They suggest a possible slight increase in 
competition through time.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper the Panzar-Rosse model has been applied in order to investigate the degree of 
competition faced by cooperative financial institutions in Vietnam.  
 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature as follows. Our results are based upon 
the largest sample both in terms of the number of banks and total sample size compared to any 
previous study of non-structural models in the Vietnamese banking system and ours is the first to 
clearly distinguish the market structure for Vietnam from other countries. This study also extends the 
previous literature by considering new additional variables. Environmental factors such as total assets, 
capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches that are incorporated in our models have 
not been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. Further, we use four different dependent variables 
to provide comparative inference. This is also the first study that considers the exclusion of assets (to 
avoid bias) and inclusion of lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) in a study of the Vietnamese 
banking system. In addition to drawing inference based on the full sample we also summarise results 
for models estimated on sub-samples of the data. In particular, we split the sample according to the 
type of bank (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) and through 
time (1999-2003 and 2004-2009). This represents a further contribution of our paper. 
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Our favoured models for inference use lagged input prices, exclude assets and employ the two-way 
fixed-effects estimator. The E-statistic suggests the banking industry is in equilibrium and so inference 
from H-statistics is valid. Our favoured results for the full sample indicate that the whole Vietnamese 
banking system is characterised by monopolistic competition with non-state owned commercial banks 
behaving more competitively than state owned commercial banks (the latter being monopolistic). 
There is some tentative evidence that the Vietnamese banking system has become slightly more 
competitive over our sample period.  
 
A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. Our inference from the favoured models using 
the revenue dependent variable indicate a slightly greater degree of competition in the Vietnamese 
banking system than those that employ interest income. Sources of revenue might be securities, credit 
cards, derivative products, etc while sources of interest income are almost all from customer loans. 
There should be more regulations and policies from the State Bank of Vietnam to enhance competition 
in terms of customer loans. Hence, the degree of competition from interest income could be improved 
in comparison with revenue. 
 
Another policy implication concerns the relationship between loans and bank revenue and interest 
income. We argue that tightening monetary policies starting in 2008 still have a big impact on the 
banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans and deposits. Generally, the banking system 
encounters many difficulties, resulting from the loss of balance in the source and use of funds, and the 
rapid increase in credit growth (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). Macroeconomic policies from the 
State Bank of Vietnam should be used simultaneously and reasonably to meet the high demand of 
loans from the public and to control increased inflation due to rapid increase in credit growth.  
 
As mentioned above our favoured results show that non-state owned commercial banks are more 
competitive than state owned commercial banks and we find that banks that open more branches 
increase their revenue and interest income except for state owned commercial banks. Thus, the State 
Bank of Vietnam should have policies to enhance the development of non-state owned commercial 
banks to raise competition and revenue in the banking system. 
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Table 1 The number of commercial banks from 1990 to 2009
13
 
Type of banks 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
State owned commercial banks  4 4 5 5 5 
Non-state owned commercial banks      
                  Joint stock commercial banks  0 36 39 37 37 
                  Branches of foreign banks  0 18 26 31 48 
                  Joint venture commercial banks  0 4 5 5 6 
                  Foreign commercial banks  0 0 0 0 5 
Total 4 62 75 78 101 
Sources: Dufhues (2003: 32); SBV (2005, 2008, 2009) and VCSC (2008). 
 
 
Table 2. Data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese commercial banks (state 
owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 2009 (Unit: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong) 
Year Bank type Loans Assets Deposits  Capital Non-performing 
loans 
1999 
 SOCBs     72,142,247      134,890,858       87,326,439       5,468,772  10.78% 
 Non-SOCBs     35,899,360        58,871,839       30,293,986       9,284,887  N/A 
2000 
 SOCBs   108,422,565      200,433,947     127,033,459       5,413,772  10.02% 
 Non-SOCBs     41,231,535        75,856,994       43,321,781     10,139,627  9.42% 
2001 
 SOCBs   135,647,621      247,151,769     160,738,302       5,421,134  8.83% 
 Non-SOCBs     45,466,715        88,614,974       51,759,565     10,953,034  7.81% 
2002 
 SOCBs   165,921,733      286,860,920     189,313,313     10,061,113  7.62% 
 Non-SOCBs     55,296,802      102,590,591       63,658,203     11,152,585  5.41% 
2003 
 SOCBs   214,481,096      367,813,825     237,485,761     14,516,916  5.13% 
 Non-SOCBs     74,068,790      130,337,981       79,255,399     12,398,334  3.57% 
2004 
 SOCBs   295,738,175      468,341,918     311,681,861     17,362,940  2.92% 
 Non-SOCBs   103,563,777      183,404,071     109,681,322     14,860,054  2.26% 
2005 
 SOCBs   380,850,503      603,540,889     406,957,181     18,429,980  3.81% 
 Non-SOCBs   143,449,737      261,307,537     144,499,838     20,009,805  1.42% 
2006 
 SOCBs   435,695,864      731,657,400     524,533,245     18,777,200  3.19% 
 Non-SOCBs   212,097,344      430,755,234     229,411,786     35,578,494  1.29% 
2007 
 SOCBs   564,677,195      904,004,852     652,913,108     30,091,997  1.87% 
 Non-SOCBs   420,184,441      903,961,807     456,920,152     66,066,418  0.94% 
2008 
 SOCBs   671,732,670   1,078,729,233     775,560,005     39,279,325  2.47% 
 Non-SOCBs   534,692,051   1,097,675,565     593,628,040   103,923,040  1.62% 
2009
14
 
 SOCBs   903,718,777   1,320,357,324     869,410,909     61,293,664  N/A 
 Non-SOCBs   560,883,667   1,210,244,318     680,665,451   115,192,318  N/A 
Note: SOCBs: State owned commercial banks; Non-SOCBs: Non-state owned commercial banks. Sources: SBV (2009); Financial statements 
of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Beside these commercial banks, there are also the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank which are operating as non-
profit institutions. 
14
 We could not collect data of the North Asia Commercial Bank and Vinasiam Bank in 2009. 
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Table 3 Fixed-effects estimations for the full sample (Observations = 376) 
 With assets and with current input prices Without assets and with current input prices 
 H-statistics E-statistics H-statistics E-statistics 
 LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Intercept 0.733 
(1.558) 
1.051** 
(2.207) 
0.036 
(1.047) 
10.556*** 
(21.510) 
10.904*** 
(22.090) 
-0.005 
(-0.240) 
LN(PE/TE) 0.130** 
(2.253) 
0.071 
(1.219) 
0.005 
(1.216) 
0.413*** 
(4.102) 
0.355*** 
(3.5035) 
0.004 
(0.953) 
LN(IE/FF) 0.395*** 
(11.759) 
0.500*** 
(14.731) 
0.001 
(0.405) 
0.480*** 
(8.117 
0.586*** 
(9.849) 
0.001 
(0.261) 
LN(CE/FA) 0.064*** 
(2.537) 
0.045* 
(1.771392) 
0.001 
(0.728692) 
0.062 
(1.398) 
0.044 
(0.9714) 
0.001 
(0.731) 
TC/TA 0.432*** 
(5.065) 
0.432*** 
(5.005) 
0.041*** 
(6.688) 
-0.662*** 
(-5.054) 
-0.666*** 
(-5.0516) 
0.0459*** 
(8.533) 
CL/CD -0.01342 
(-1.429) 
-0.009 
(-0.936) 
-0.001 
(-0.737) 
-0.021 
(-1.259) 
-0.016 
(-0.982) 
-0.000 
(-0.691) 
LN(TA) -0.195*** 
(-6.275) 
-0.193*** 
(-6.125) 
-0.003 
(-1.471)    
LN(BR) 0.145*** 
(3.721) 
0.152*** 
(3.856) 
0.003 
(1.124) 
0.740*** 
(13.286) 
0.749*** 
(13.368) 
0.001 
(0.315) 
R2 0.725 0.758 0.497 0.961 0.961 0.494 
Adj. R2 0.669 0.708 0.394 0.953 0.953 0.392 
1
0H  
3.961*** 
Reject 
3.430*** 
Reject 
1.680*** 
Reject 
19.286*** 
Reject 
18.679*** 
Reject 
1.629*** 
Reject 
2
0H  
3.854*** 
Reject 
3.166*** 
Reject 
1.861*** 
Reject 
17.022*** 
Reject 
16.278*** 
Reject 
1.819*** 
Reject 
H-sta. [E-sta.] 0.589 0.617 [0.007] 0.956 0.984 [0.006] 
Ho: H=0 77.593*** 
Reject 
83.076*** 
Reject 
2.345 
Accept 
68.154*** 
Reject 
71.480*** 
Reject 
1.552 
Accept 
Ho: H=1 37.645*** 
Reject 
31.999*** 
Reject 
--- 0.146 
Accept 
0.018 
Accept 
--- 
F-statistic 12.827*** 15.238*** 4.812*** 122.817*** 122.926*** 4.836*** 
 With assets and with lagged input prices Without assets and with lagged input prices 
 H-statistics E-statistics H-statistics E-statistics 
 LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Intercept 0.681 
(1.034) 
0.683 
(0.945) 
0.029 
(0.711) 
11.233*** 
(20.302) 
11.485*** 
(19.670) 
-0.034 
(-1.504) 
LN(PE/TE)(t-1) 0.066 
(0.913) 
-0.004 
(-0.047) 
0.009 
(2.057) 
0.218* 
(1.950) 
0.151 
(1.281) 
0.008* 
(1.862) 
LN(IE/FF)(t-1) 0.082* 
(1.932) 
0.136*** 
(2.934) 
-0.003 
(-1.183) 
0.245*** 
(3.847) 
0.303*** 
(4.513) 
-0.004 
(-1.579) 
LN(CE/FA)(t-1) 0.012 
(0.376) 
-0.002 
(-0.065) 
-0.001 
(-0.569) 
-0.009 
(-0.192) 
-0.024 
(-0.467) 
-0.001 
(-0.503) 
TC/TA 0.240** 
(2.242) 
0.210* 
(1.787) 
0.033*** 
(4.882) 
-0.893*** 
(-6.489) 
-0.949*** 
(-6.541) 
0.040*** 
(7.042) 
CL/CD -0.072** 
(-2.333) 
-0.041 
(-1.203) 
-0.002 
(-1.179) 
-0.120** 
(-2.538) 
-0.090* 
(-1.802) 
-0.002 
(-1.028) 
LN(TA) -0.217*** 
(-5.304) 
-0.198*** 
(-4.422) 
-0.005* 
(-1.832)    
LN(BR) 0.079 
(1.593) 
0.065 
(1.183) 
0.003 
(1.053) 
0.624*** 
(9.922) 
0.622*** 
(9.375) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
R2 0.650 0.635 0.547 0.961 0.957 0.541 
Adj. R2 0.569 0.550 0.442 0.952 0.948 0.437 
1
0H  
3.363*** 
Reject 
1.904 
Accept 
1.736*** 
Reject 
16.318*** 
Reject 
14.782*** 
Reject 
1.684*** 
Reject 
2
0H  
4.299*** 
Reject 
85.161*** 
Reject 
2.044*** 
Reject 
14.486*** 
Reject 
13.2512*** 
Reject 
1.986*** 
Reject 
H-sta. [E-sta.] 0.160 0.130 [0.007] 0.453 0.430 [0.003] 
Ho: H=0 3.477* 
Accept 
1.904 
Accept 
0.909 
Accept 
12.136*** 
Reject 
9.814*** 
Reject 
0.401 
Accept 
Ho: H=1 95.566*** 
Reject 
85.161*** 
Reject 
--- 17.633*** 
Reject 
17.207*** 
Reject 
--- 
F-statistic 8.055*** 7.545*** 5.237*** 109.849*** 100.225*** 5.222*** 
Note: R2 denotes the coefficient of determination, Adj. R2 the adjusted coefficient of determination,
 
1
0H  is an F-test for the significance of cross-sectional 
fixed-effects, 
2
0H  is an F-test for the joint significance of cross-sectional and time-period fixed-effects and F-sta. tests the null that R2 is equal to zero. The 
variables’ coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) are reported in the table; *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level and * 
significance at the 10% level. Source for the data are the financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks.  
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Table 4 The instruments of input prices and the Wu-Hausman test for the full sample  
  With assets Without assets 
  Adj. R2  F-test Adj. R2  F-test 
Instrumented        
input price 
equations 
LN(PE/TE) 0.902 
  
47.141*** 
[0.000] 
0.900 
 
47.789*** 
[0.000] 
 LN(IE/FF) 0.661 
  
10.765*** 
[0.000] 
0.618 
 
9.360*** 
[0.000] 
 LN(CE/FA) 0.723 
 
14.105*** 
[0.000] 
0.724 
 
14.603*** 
[0.000] 
        
  LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Wu-Hausman test        
 Res[LN(PE/TE)] -0.270** 
(-2.180) 
-0.204 
(-1.618) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.643) 
-0.213 
(-1.014) 
-0.165 
(-0.773) 
-0.019** 
(-2.029) 
 Res[LN(IE/FF)] -0.290*** 
(-3.165) 
-0.185** 
(-1.987) 
-0.006 
(-0.783) 
-0.170 
(-0.870) 
-0.174 
(-0.880) 
0.033*** 
(3.853) 
 Res[LN(CE/FA)] 0.112 
(1.325) 
 
0.108 
(1.263) 
 
0.013** 
(1.966) 
 
0.058 
(0.399) 
 
0.072 
(0.482) 
 
0.007 
(1.030) 
 
 F-All inputs 4.707*** 
[0.003] 
2.282* 
[0.080] 
3.212** 
[0.024] 
0.533 
[0.660] 
0.432 
[0.731] 
7.578*** 
[0.000] 
Note (Also see note to Table 3): The variables which are included as the regressors in the instrument equations are LN(PE(-1)/TE(-1)), LN(IE(-
1)/FF(-1)), LN(CE(-1)/FA(-1)), TC/TA, CL/CD, LN(BR), LN(TA), TC(-1)/TA(-1), CL(-1)/CD(-1), LN(BR(-1)) and LN(TA(-1)). The models without 
assets exclude LN(TA) and LN(TA(-1)). The instruments are the same for every single instrumented equation. The top panel of the table 
(highlighted in grey) gives the  ̅  and F-test (with probability values in squared parentheses) for the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients 
are equal to zero in the instrument equations for the three dependent variables LN(PE/TE), LN(IE/FF) and LN(CE/FA). The bottom panel of the 
table reports the coefficients and t-ratios (in parentheses) from the residuals of the three instrument equations, denoted Res[LN(PE/TE)], 
Res[LN(IE/FF)] and Res[LN(CE/FA)], when added simultaneously to the revenue and profit equations reported in Table 3.AnF-statistic 
(denoted F-All inputs) for the null that the coefficients on all three residual terms are jointly zero in any particular equation is also reported 
with associated probability values in squared parentheses. The Wu-Hausman test statistics are given by the t-ratios and F-statistics in the 
bottom panel of the table. If any of these statistics is significant in any particular equation it suggests violation of the assumption of the 
weak exogeneity of current period input prices in that equation. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Summary of results from the non-structural model  
Equilibrium  
approach 
Current input prices Lagged input prices 
With assets  Without assets  With assets Without assets 
LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) 
Full sample H-sta. 0.589 0.617 0.956 0.984 0.160 0.130 0.453 0.430 
1999-2009 H=0 77.593*** 
 Reject 
83.076*** 
 Reject 
68.154*** 
 Reject 
71.480*** 
 Reject 
3.477* 
 Accept 
1.904 
Accept 
12.136*** 
 Reject 
9.814*** 
 Reject 
 H=1 37.645*** 
 Reject 
31.999*** 
 Reject 
0.146 
 Accept 
0.018 
 Accept 
95.566*** 
 Reject 
85.161*** 
Reject 
17.633*** 
 Reject 
17.207*** 
 Reject 
non-SOCBs  H-sta. 0.621 0.651 1.138 1.164 0.185 0.159 0.543 0.519 
1999-2009 H=0 60.623*** 
 Reject 
36.137*** 
 Reject 
91.7403*** 
 Reject 
97.335*** 
 Reject 
3.409* 
 Accept 
2.128 
Accept 
15.318*** 
 Reject 
12.808*** 
 Reject 
 H=1 22.656*** 
 Reject 
7.914*** 
 Reject 
1.3586 
 Accept 
1.9482 
Accept 
65.523*** 
 Reject 
59.506*** 
 Reject 
10.883*** 
 Reject 
10.941*** 
 Reject 
SOCBs H-sta. 0.5674 0.681 0.636 0.748 -0.149 -0.174 -0.136 -0.159 
1999-2009 H=0 30.566*** 
 Reject 
36.137*** 
 Reject 
18.634*** 
 Reject 
24.066*** 
 Reject 
0.741 
 Accept 
0.694 
 Accept 
0.377 
Accept 
0.380 
 Accept 
 H=1 17.762*** 
 Reject 
7.914*** 
 Reject 
6.081*** 
 Reject 
2.728** 
 Reject 
44.061*** 
 Reject 
31.641*** 
 Reject 
26.234*** 
 Reject 
20.074*** 
 Reject 
Sub-sample H-sta. 0.364 0.816 0.562 1.009 0.053 0.224 (OLS) 0.031 -0.050 
1999-2003 H=0 3.511* 
Accept 
17.507*** 
 Reject 
5.234*** 
 Reject 
17.155*** 
 Reject 
0.017 
 Accept 
2.510 
Accept 
0.004 
Accept 
0.008 
Accept 
 H=1 10.683*** 
 Reject 
0.881 
Accept 
3.170* 
 Accept 
0.001 
Accept 
5.578** 
 Reject 
30.242*** 
Reject 
4.546** 
Reject 
3.574 
 Accept 
Sub-sample H-sta. 0.618 0.609 0.751 0.736 0.003 -0.016 0.049 0.028 
2004-2009 H=0 58.468*** 
 Reject 
61.312*** 
 Reject 
26.7634*** 
 Reject 
27.985*** 
 Reject 
0.000 
 Accept 
0.029 
 Accept 
0.118 
Accept 
0.042 
 Accept 
 H=1 22.198*** 
 Reject 
25.237*** 
 Reject 
2.9208* 
 Accept 
3.589* 
Accept 
105.540*** 
 Reject 
114.604*** 
 Reject 
43.291*** 
 Reject 
48.164*** 
 Reject 
Note (Also see note to Table 3): SOCBs: State owned commercial banks; Non-SOCBs: Non-state owned commercial banks; All the models use 
2-way-FE except the sub-sample 1999-2003 assuming lagged input prices for LN(INT/TA) which is pooled OLS (Ordinary Least Square). All are 
in equilibrium except the sub-sample 1999-2003 using lagged input prices for LN(REV/TA), LN(REV) and LN(INT). 
